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Insurance

Law-UNINSURED MoTORIST CovERAGE-INSURERS
EXTENDING LIABILITY CovERAGE INTO MEXICO NEED NOT PRoviDE
COEXTENSIVE UNINSURED MoTORIST CoVERAGE- Transamerica Insurance Co. v. McKee, 27 Ariz. App. 158, 551 P.2d 1324 (1976),
review denied, No. 12783-PR (Ariz., Sept. 14, 1976).

In October 1973, four Arizona families went on a short vacation trip to Mexico, taking several vehicles, including a custommade dune buggy. The dune buggy's owner gave an adult member of the party permission to use the vehicle to take three children for a ride, during which the vehicle overturned, causing
extensive injuries to the two minor claimants.
Because of various exclusions in applicable automobile lia~
bility insurance policies, neither the dune buggy nor its driver
were insured for the claimants' injuries.• Therefore, the claimants
sought recovery under the uninsured motorist provision of their
families' automobile insurance policies. Transamerica Insurance
Company (Transamerica) had issued nearly identical automobile
policies to both claimants' families. Both extended liability coverage to "anywhere in the world," yet limited the territory of the
uninsured motorist coverage to the United States, its territories
or possessions, and Canada. 2
The claimants sought a declaratory judgment that (1). automobile insurance policy provisions granting liability coverage but
excluding uninsured motorist coverage in Mexico are contrary to
Arizona statutes or public policy, and (2) policy exclusions in a
Mexico coverage endorsement providing that "Family Protection
Coverage" is not applicable to accidents occurring in Mexico are
ambiguous and therefore ineffective. 3 An Arizona superior court
granted summary judgment in favor of the claimants on both
grounds, and Transamerica appealed. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the policy provisions were ambiguous, but disagreed with the lower court's first determination,
stating that if an insurance company chooses to write liability
1. At the time of the accident the dune buggy was not insured by any United States
insurance company. Although the owner had procured Mexican insurance for the trip, the
Mexican insurance policy excluded coverage for damages arising from bodily injuries to
passengers. The driver-tortfeasor had liability insurance coverage with an American insurance company. However, his policy provided coverage for accidents occurring within Mexico only if the accident occurred within 50 miles of the United States border. Thus, neither
the vehicle nor its driver were insured for the bodily injuries sustained by the claimants.
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. McKee, 27 Ariz. App. 158, 160, 551 P.2d 1324, 1326 (1976).
2. 27 Ariz. App. at 160, 551 P.2d at 1326.
3. Brief for Appellees at 2-4.
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policies covering accidents in countries other than the United
States and Canada, neither Arizona statutes nor public policy
require it to provide coextensive uninsured motorist coverage:'
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Historical Development of Uninsured Motorist Coverage

The rapid expansion of automobile use on American highways brought a concomitant increase in the incidence of automobile accidents and resulting injuries. 5 Whenever the responsible
motorist carried automobile liability insurance or possessed sufficient wealth, no social problem was created since the innocent
victim received compensation for his injuries. Unfortunately, not
all persons whose negligent conduct inflicted injuries on their
fellow travelers could meet the financial burden that traditional
legal processes placed upon them. Since an award of compensatory damages to the innocent parties was meaningless when the
wrongdoer was financially irresponsible, the injured party bore
the loss himself. As these cases increased in num her, the problem
became one of nationwide significance and the public demanded
a solution.
1.

Financial responsibility laws

The initial legislative response to this problem· was the enactment of various state financial responsibility laws. Beginning
with Connecticut in 1925, 6 all states and the District of Columbia
enacted some variant of financial responsibility legislation. 7
4. 27 Ariz. App. at 161-62, 551 P.2d at 1327-28.
5.

Year
1915
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970

Number of Motor
Vehicle Registrations
Issued
2,490,900
26,749,800
32,453,200
49,161,600
73,868,600
108,407,300

Millions of
Miles Driven
in the U.S.
206,320
302,188
458,246
718,845
1,120,705

Number of
Auto Accidents

6,100,000
8,300,000
10,400,000
16,000,000

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CoLONIAL TiMES TO 1970, H.R. Doc. No. 93-78 Part 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 716,
718-20 (1975).
6. 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 183.
7. SeeM. WooDROOF, J. FoNSECA, & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-

231]

CASE NOTES

233

These financial responsibility laws were intended to induce motorists to acquire liability insurance. 8 They provided, in essence,
that where a financially irresponsible motorist was involved in an
accident involving bodily injury or property damage above a certain specified amount and failed to respond in damages, his license was automatically revoked. The license would not be restored until he submitted proof of future financial responsibility
(usually in the form of an insurance policy). 9 These laws were
characterized as "first bite" statutes since the motorist was entitled to one accident before he became subject to financial responsibility;10 no statute provided for compensating the first victim.
These laws also did not apply to accidents involving stolen cars
or hit-and-run accidents where the responsible driver could not
be identified. Further, the state's license revocation power did not
extend to out-of-state or foreign motorists.U These gaps in the
financial responsibility laws left many injured persons without
financial remuneration. 12
FAULT LAW § 3:5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WooDROOF]. For a list of the original statute
citations, see Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation:
Past, Present and Future, 8 BuFFALO L. REv. 215, 218 n.8 (1959). For a more current list
and analysis of state financial responsibility laws, see R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM app. C, at 539-42 (1965).
8. A. WIDISS, A GuiDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE§ 1.2 (1969). In Schecter v.
Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 280, 380 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1963), the court stated:
The Financial Responsibility Act has for its principal purpose the protection of the public using the highways from financial hardship which may result
from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons . . . . It may,
as incidental purposes and effects . . . (1) encourage operators of motor vehicles
to obtain liability insurance and (2) encourage drivers to drive more carefully.
Accord, Canal Ins. Co. v. Sinclair, 208 Kan. 753, 761-62, 494 P.2d 1197, 1203 (1972);
LaPoint v. Richards, 66 Wash. 2d 585, 590, 403 P.2d 889, 893 (1965).
Prior to the adoption of its financial responsibility act in 1951, the percentage of uninsured motorists in Arizona may have been as high as 70%. See Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. at 285, 380 P.2d at 144.
9. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28-1142 (1976).
10. Notman, A Decennial Study of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 43 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 5, 6 (1967). This situation was "reminiscent of the old common-law rule applied to the canine species of tortfeasors: one 'free bite' is allowed. The procedure looks
to the second accident, not the first, and requires proof of only future financial responsibility." /d.
11. Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 361Ns. CouNSEL J. 397, 398 (1969).
12. For example, in the early 1950's the loss attributed to uninsured motorists in New
York State alone had risen to over $7 million per year even though 80-85% of that state's
motorists carried liability insurance. NEW YORK DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROBLEM OF THE
UNINSURED MOTORIST 10 (1951), cited in A. WIDISS, supra note 8·, § 1.6. Similarly, estimates
in the latter part of the 1950's showed that at least one-third of Virginia's automobile
accidents involved an uninsured vehicle. Comment, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in
Virginia, 47 VA. L. REv. 145, 145 (1961).
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Uninsured motorist coverage legislation

Attempting to fill the gaps left by financial responsibility
legislation, state legislatures enacted a variety of statutes ranging
from state-sponsored unsatisfied judgment funds 13 to mandatory
liability insurance for all automobile owners. 14 The insurance industry responded to the problem by developing uninsured motorist coverage as a relatively inexpensive addition to the standard
policy of automobile liability insurance. Uninsured motorist coverage is, in effect, insurance against a tortfeasor's lack of insurance. Under this coverage, the insured can recover the amount of
damages he or she would have been entitled to receive from the
owner or operator of an uninsured or hit-and-run vehicle. 15 This
coverage is currently a standard form endorsement, generally referred to as either uninsured motorist coverage or family protection insurance. 16
The insurance industry's introduction of uninsured motorist
coverage prompted state legislation requiring insurance companies to offer uninsured motorist coverage as a supplement to every
automobile liability insurance policy issued in the enacting state.
The purposes of this legislation were to close the gaps inherent
in the financial responsibility laws and to provide protection to
victims of negligent uninsured motorists. 17 Forty-eight states and
13. Unsatisfied judgment funds have been widely discussed, but only five statesNorth Dakota, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey and New York have established the
funds. A. Wm1ss, supra note 8, § 1.5. For an excellent treatment of this subject, see V.
HALLMAN, UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT FUNDS (1968).
14. Massachusetts (1925), New York (1956), and North Carolina (1957) are the only
states that have enacted compulsory insurance requirements. A. Wmiss, supra note 8, §
1.2 & n.6. For a general discussion ofthese states' statutes, seeR. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,
supra note 7, at 76-102.
15. I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE§ 17.01 (rev. 1975). Uninsured motorist coverage was made available throughout the United States in 1956. For the 1956
Countrywide Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, see DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., INC. & J.
CoRBLEY, UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION app. B, at 44-45 (1968) and A. Wmiss, supra
note 8, app. A 2, at 299-305.
16. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, § 1.10 n.35:
The terms "uninsured motorist coverage" and "family protection insurance" have been used interchangeably by the industry to identify this coverage,
and have been accorded general acceptance as the appropriate nomenclature.
However, individual insurance companies are free to choose that terminology
which they deem desirable. Thus, the endorsement has received numerous other
designations, such as "Innocent Victim Coverage" and "Family Protection
Against Uninsured Motorists."
Note that one of the issues in the instant case was whether Transamerica's use of these
two terms was ambiguous.
17. See, e.g., Balestrieri v. Hartford Ace. & lndem. Ins. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 255, 257,
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the District of Columbia presently have uninsured motorist statutes.18 Fifteen states (including Arizona) mandate the inclusion
of uninsured motorist coverage in every automobile liability policy issued in the state; the remaining states require that the insurer offer the endorsement but give the insured the right to reject
the offered coverage.t 9 In spite of these and other differences,
many of the provisions of uninsured motorist statutes enacted
throughout the country are identical. 20 Therefore, issues raised
under one jurisdiction's uninsured motorist statute will seldom,
if ever, be unique to that jurisdiction.

B.

Territorial Limitations

1. Liability coverage originally limited to the United States and
Canada
Uninsured motorist legislation has no territorial limits; that
is, the statutes obligating insurance companies to provide coverage neither specify the required geographical scope of coverage
nor sanction any territorial restrictions or limitations. 21 When
uninsured motorist coverage was made available in 1956, the
standard automobile liability policies limited their territory of
526 P.2d 779, 781 (1974); Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 547 P.2d 1350, 1354
(Hawaii 1976).
18. Uninsured motorist coverage is required by statute in every state except Maryland and New Jersey. WooDROOF, supra note 7, § 7.2. For a compilation of the 48 state
statutes, see id. § 1.48 n.41; A. WIDISS, supra note 8, app. B 1, at 306-09. For a chart
illustrating the various provisions of state uninsured motorist laws, seeP. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MoTORISTS app. A, at 200-03 (1972).
19. The 15 states requiring uninsured motorist coverage with no right of rejection are
Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Also, uninsured motorist coverage on private passenger vehicles may not be
rejected in Minnesota and Pennsylvania. I. SCHERMER, supra note 15, § 17 .01.
20. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, § 3.2. For example, at least 35 states have adopted a
provision substantially like the following:
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against
loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered
by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any
motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set
forth in [the state's financial responsibility statutes], for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
/d.
21. ld. § 3.5.
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coverage to the United States, its territories and possessions, and
Canada. 22 Since uninsured motorist coverage was an endorsement
to existing automobile liability policies, the uninsured motorist
coverage was limited to the same territory by the insurance industry.2a
The only challenge to an insurance policy's territorial provisions limiting both liability and uninsured motorist coverage to
the United States and Canada was unsuccessful. 24 It has since
been generally understood that an uninsured motorist provision
is subject to the same geographic limitations that apply to the
liability coverage in the policy. 25 Hence, the effect of a provision
in an automobile liability policy providing coverage only to accidents occurring while the insured automobile is in the United
States or Canada is to exclude uninsured motorist coverage for
accidents occurring outside of the United States or Canada.
2.

Liability coverage extended into Mexico

As more Americans drove into Mexico for business, vacation,
and recreation, 26 they demanded and received automobile liabil22. Paragraph VIIT of the 1955 Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination
Policies, entitled "Policy Period, Territory, Purpose of·Use," stated: "[t]his policy applies only to accidents which occur and to direct and accidental losses to the automobile
which are sustained during the policy period, while the automobile is within the United
States o(America, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or is being transported between
ports thereof . . . . " R. KEETON, BAsic INsuRANCE LAw app. F, at 635 (1960).
23. Paragraph m of the 1956 Countrywide Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, entitled
"Policy Period, Territory," stated: "[t]his endorsement applies only to accidents which
occur on and after the effective date hereof, during the policy period and within the United
States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada." DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., INC.
& J. CoRBLEY, supra note 15, app. B, at 44.
24. In American Cas. Co. v. Foster, 31 Misc. 2d 818, 219 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct.
1961), the court determined that a policy's territorial provision providing coverage "only
to accidents, occurrences and loss . . . while the automobile is within the United States
of America . . . or Canada" excluded coverage of the insured's injuries sustained while
riding in an uninsured vehicle in Italy. The court commented on the quoted provision:
Although it is true that the insurer here could have written its policy so as
to obviate any possible doubt that the coverage was to apply to accidents occurring only in the United States or Canada, it is abundantly clear that that is the
only logical import of the policy. Any other interpretation would be strained and
illogical.
31 Misc. 2d at 819, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
25. 12 CoucH ON INSURANCE (SECOND) § 45:647 (1964).
26. In 1940, United States citizens crossed the Mexican border less than 8 million
times; in 1974 they crossed the border approximately 68 million times. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, 1974 ANNUAL REPORT Table 20, at 80
(1974). These figures represent the number of times United States citizens crossed the
border back into the United States. The Mexican government apparently does not record
the number of United States citizens crossing into Mexico.
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ity insurance coverage extending into Mexico. 27 However, insurance companies granting United States citizens liability coverage
into Mexico refuse to provide uninsured motorist coverage beyond the United States-Mexican border. Undoubtedly this is due
in part to the large number of uninsured motorists in Mexico. 28
The only previous case involving the issue of whether an
insurance company violates public policy by restricting its uninsured motorist coverage to the United States and Canada while
extending liability coverage into Mexico is Mission Insurance Co.
v. Brown. 29 In that case, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that the public policy of California as evidenced by
27. See generally Robbins & Netherton, Mexican Automobile & Insurance Law, 47
MICH. ST. B.J. 22, 28 (Jan. 1968).
Various insurance policies have expanded their territorial limits to include coverage
into Mexico for accidents 50, 75, or 100 miles from the United States border. See, e.g.,
Kvalheim v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 195 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Iowa 1972) (policy limiting
coverage to 75 miles into Mexico). This was the same type of policy carried by the tortfeasor in the instant case. 27 Ariz. App. at 160, 551 P.2d at 1326.
Other insurance companies have provided a "Mexico Endorsement" covering journeys into Mexico for limited amounts of time. See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v.
Kresch, 48 Cal. App. 3d 640,645, 121 Cal. Rptr. 773,775 (1975); Mission Ins. Co. v. Brown,
63 Cal. 2d 508, 509, 407 P.2d 275, 275, 47 Cal. Rptr. 363, 363 (1965). Similarly, the
claimant's Mexico Endorsement issued by Transamerica provided liability coverage
throughout all of Mexico for occasional trips not exceeding a period of 10 days at a time.
Brief for Appellees at 13.
Recently some insurance companies have redefined the territory covered by their
policies as "anywhere in the world," provided the claim is filed in the United States. The
general liability-automobile policy form found in R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE
LAw app. G, at 654 (1971), provides the following as its policy territory:
(1) the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada,
or
(3) anywhere ·in the world with respect to damages because of bodily injury or property damage arising out of a product which was sold for use . . .
within the territory described in paragraph (1) above, provided the original suit
for such damages is brought within such territory.
The territory of the Transamerica policies involved in the instant case was "anywhere
in the world," provided that resulting claims were originally asserted in the United States.
27 Ariz. App. at 160, 551 P.2d at 1326.
28. Only about 20% of Mexican drivers are insured. Robbins & Netherton, supra note
27, at 28. Seguros La Provincial, a leading insurance company in Mexico, estimates the
current percentage of insured Mexican motorists as only 18%. Letter from American
Embassy in Mexico, Office of Citizens Consular Services, to Brigham Young University
Law Review (Sept. 9, 1976).
29. 63 Cal. 2d 508, 407 P.2d 275, 47 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1965). The claimants in Mission
Ins. Co. v. Brown received personal injuries in a collision wit.h an uninsured vehicle less
than 75 miles from the United States border and within 10 days after entering Mexico
(hence, within their liability policy coverage). The territory on their uninsured motorist
endorsement was limited to the United States and Canada. Id. at 509, 407 P .2d at 27576, 47 Cal. Rptr. ab363-64.
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its uninsured motorist statute30 required an insurance company
that extended liability coverage into Mexico to likewise extend
uninsured motorist coverage. 31 In so doing the court declared the
territorial limits stated in the policy to be void. 32 In support of its
holding the court reasoned that (1) California's uninsured motorist statute was designed to minimize losses to California residents
who are involved in accidents with uninsured or financially irresponsible motorists; (2) the California statute did not contemplate a piecemeal whittling away of liability for injuries caused
by uninsured motorists, either territorially or under other conditions; and (3) public policy required uninsured motorist coverage
to extend to the same territory in which an insured is covered for
liability. 33

n.

INsTANT CAsE

The majority and concurring opinions concluded that although the terms "uninsured motorist protection" and "family
protection" are synonymous in the insurance trade, 34 lay persons
would have no such understanding unless the terms were defined
in the policy. Since the term "family protection coverage" was
not defined in the policies, the court concluded that the two
Transamerica policies were ambiguous. 35 The court therefore construed the ambiguity against the insurer38 and affirmed the ruling
of the superior court.
The majority determined, however, that neither Arizona
statutes nor public policy drawn from those statutes required
insurers who write liability insurance outside of the United States
or Canada to provide coextensive uninsured motorist coverage. In
reaching its conclusion, the majority first analyzed the section of
Arizona's financial responsibility law which provides that an
owner's automobile liability policy must insure against loss from
30. 1961 Cal. Stats. ch. 1189, § 1 (current version at CAL. INs. CoDE§ 11580.2(a) (West
1972)).
31. 63 Cal. 2d at 510, 407 P.2d at 276, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
32. Id., 407 P.2d at 276, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
33. /d. at 509-11, 407 P .2d at 276-77, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
34. See note 16 supra.
35. 27 Ariz. App. at 161-62, 551 P.2d at 1327-28.
36. It is a general principle of insurance law that all ambiguities in an insurance
policy are to be construed in the light most favorable to the insured and against the
insurer-draftsman. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 24 Ariz. App. 18, 21,
535 P.2d 46, 49 (1975); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 102,
514 P.2d 123, 128, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 816 (1973); Witherspoon v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 86 Wash. 2d 641, 548 P.2d 302, 308 (1976).
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liability imposed by law within the United States or Canada. 37
Noting that Arizona's uninsured motorist statute contained no
territorial limitation and reasoning that the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute was to close the gaps left open by the
financial responsibility laws, the majority concluded that the territorial coverage required by the Arizona uninsured motorist statute was the same as that required of liability coverage by the
financial responsibility laws, namely, the United States and Canada.38
After determining that the Arizona uninsured motorist statute did not mandate the extension of uninsured motorist coverage
into Mexico, the majority summarily disposed of the public policy question, finding no statutory public policy requiring the extension of uninsured motorist coverage into foreign countries. 39
Similarly, the majority rejected Mission Insurance Co. v. Brown,
stating that it was unable to agree with the California Supreme
Court's decision. 40
The concurring opinion disagreed with both the majority's
statutory and public policy determinations, contending that Arizona's uninsured motorist statute and public policy implicitly
required that all automobile liability policies provide coextensive
uninsured motorist coverage. It advocated adherence to the California Supreme Court's "prudent course" of requiring coextensive
liability and uninsured motorist coverage, fearing that in rejecting the rule set down in Mission Insurance Co. v. Brown, the
majority created a "serious gap" in Arizona's minimum standards of insurance protection. 41

ill.

ANALYSIS

With only one case precedent and virtually no legal commentaries on the issue, the court chose to decide the instant case
solely on an interpretation of Arizona's uninsured motorist stat37. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 28-1170(B) (1976) provides in part:
The owner's policy of liability issurance must comply with the following requirements:
2. It shall insure the person named therein . . . against loss from the
liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of the motor vehicle . . . within the United States or the Dominion of
Canada . . . .
38. 27 Ariz. App. at 160-61, 551 P.2d at 1326-27.
39. /d. at 161, 551 P.2d at 1327.
40. /d., 551 P.2d at 1327.
41. /d. at 162-63, 551 P.2d at 1328-29.
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ute, 42 two sections of the financial responsibility statute, 43 and the
public policy it found evidenced by those statutes. 44 Had the
court broadened its analysis, realized the inadequacy of a narrow
statutory determination, and considered manifestations of public
policy not found in the statutory language, it probably would
have concluded that the needs of the Arizona motoring public
would be best met by requiring coextensive liability and uninsured motorist coverage. This note first examines the court's attempt to determine legislative intent through statutory language
and then evaluates nonstatutory manifestations of public policy
that the court should have considered in reaching its decision.

A.

Legislative Intent

The purpose of financial responsibility laws and uninsured
motorist statutes is to protect persons using the highways from
financial hardship that may result from the use of automobiles
by financially irresponsible or uninsured persons. 45 Courts facing
territorial limitations in this area could interpret uninsured motorist statutes in one of several ways. As will be discussed below,
the failure of uninsured motorist statutes to mandate territorial
boundaries could imply that the various state legislatures intended to either (1) adopt the boundaries established in the financial responsibility laws, namely, the United States and Canada; (2) require coextensive liability and uninsured motorist coverage; or (3) protect United States citizens wherever they travel.
A final and probably most likely inference is that the drafters of
the statutes simply failed to consider the territorial boundary
question.
42. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 20-259.01(A) (1975) provides in part:
On and after January 1, 1966, no automobile liability or motor vehicle
liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for
bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery
in this state, with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state, unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in
limits for bodily injury or death set forth in§ 28-1142, under provisions filed with
and approved by the insurance director, for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators
of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
43. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§§ 28-1142 & 28-1170(B)(2) (1976).
44. 27 Ariz. App. at 160-61, 551 P.2d at 1326-27.
45. See notes 8 and 17 and accompanying text supra.
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1. Territorial boundaries of uninsured motorist coverage
established by financial responsibility laws

The Arizona uninsured motorist statute provides that all insurance policies insuring any vehicle registered or principally garaged in Arizona must provide uninsured motorist coverage in
monetary limits specified in a section of Arizona's financial responsibility laws. 46 The court in the instant case reasoned that
since the legislature provided no statutory territorial boundaries
in the uninsured motorist statute, yet referred therein to the monetary limits of the state's financial responsibility laws, it intended
the uninsured motorist statutory boundaries to be those named
in the prior laws, namely, the United States and CanadaY
This line of reasoning finds support in the fact that the uninsured motorist statutes were passed by state legislatures to fill
gaps left by the financial responsibility laws; the two laws were
to complement each other. Since the financial responsibility laws
do not mention Mexico, 48 arguably the tandem uninsured motorist statutes likewise do not statutorily require coverage extending
into Mexico.
An inherent weakness in this statutory interpretation is the
assumption that since the uninsured motorist statute refers to
one section of the financial responsibility laws 49 (adopting its required monetary limits), it therefore assumes other definitions
and specifications of another section of those laws 50 (requiring
liability coverage for accidents in the United States and Canada).
A literal reading of the uninsured motorist statute reveals that its
only reference to the financial responsibility laws is to the monetary limits51 covering bodily injury or death. This indicates only
46. For the language of Arizona's uninsured motorist statute, see note 42 supra. The
monetary limits required of uninsured motorist coverage in Arizona are "fifteen thousand
dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and . . .
not less than thirty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more
persons in any one accident . . . . "ARiz. REv. STAT. § 28-1142 (1976); see note 51 infra.
47. 27 Ariz. App. at 161, 551 P.2d at 1327.
48. The financial responsibility laws require automobile liability insurers to protect
the insured "against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United
States or the Dominion of Canada . . . . "ARiz. REv. STAT. § 28-1170(B)(2) (1976).
49. AR1z. REv. STAT. § 28-1142 (1976).
50. AR1z. REv. STAT. § 28-1170(B) (1976).
51. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28-1142(C) (1976) provides:
Every such policy . . . is subject, if the accident has resulted in bodily injury
or death, to a limit . . . of not less than fifteen thousand dollars because of
bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to the
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that the legislature intended to require the minimum uninsured
motorist coverage to be at least as great as that required of
liability policies, 52 not that the territorial coverage of the uninsured motorist statute is limited to the United States and Canada.53 Taking the minimum territorial requirement of liability
policies from the financial responsibility laws and imposing it as
an uninsured motorist coverage restriction works against the remedial purpose of the uninsured motorist statute, 54 namely, to fill
the gaps left by the minimum requirements55 of the financial
limit for one person, to a limit of not less than thirty thousand dollars because
of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and, if
the accident has resulted in injury to or destruction of property, to a limit of
not less than ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property
of others in any one accident.
52. The majority of states today require that insurance companies provide liability
and uninsured motorist coverage in minimum amounts not less than those fixed by the
financial responsibility law of the state. WooDROOF, supra note 7, § 7:13. Three states,
Connecticut, Minnesota, and New Hampshire, require the insurer to write uninsured
motorist coverage up to the amount requested by the insured in basic liability coverage.
/d.

For a recent list of the minimum amounts required of uninsured motorist coverage,
see P. PRETZEL, supra note 18, app. A, at 200-03.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28-1170(B)(2) (1976) requires automobile insurance companies to
provide coverage:
[S]ubject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each
motor vehicle as follows:
(a) Fifteen thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident.
(b) Subject to the limit for one person, thirty thousand dollars because of
bodily injury to or death of two or more persons In any one accident.
(c) Ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property
of others in any one accident.
See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 28-1142(C) (1976). The financial responsibility laws of every state
contain a similar or identical provision, but provide varying amounts of minimum limits.
For a list of these minimal financial responsibility requirements, see R. KEETON & J.
O'CoNNELL, supra note 7, app. C, at 539-42 (1965).
53. This is evidenced by the inapplicability of other provisions within the same section of the financial responsibility law. For example, the Arizona uninsured motorist
statute provides coverage only for bodily injury or death. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 20-259.01(A)
(1975). The section of Arizona's financial responsibility law referred to in the uninsured
motorist statute, ARiz. REv. STAT. § 28-1142 (1976), specifies limits for bodily injury or
death and property damage. Clearly, the part of the section setting limits for property
damage is inapplicable. Uninsured motorist coverage is designed as a bodily injury protection. Only the following six states have expanded that initial design to require (or allow)
uninsured motorist protection for property damage: Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. WooDROOF, supra note 7, § 7:3.
54. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
55. The parties to an insurance contract may agree on higher limits or more expansive
territories than the minimums required by the financial responsibility laws. E.g., McCarthy v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1972); State Farm Mut.
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responsibility laws. 56

2.

Coextensive liability and uninsured motorist coverage

The language of the uninsured motorist statutes support a
second interpretation, the one voiced by the California Supreme
Court in Mission Insurance Co. v. Brown and advocated in the
concurring opinion of the instant case. This interpretation requires an insurance company to provide coextensive uninsured
motorist protection if it chooses to write liability insurance in
Mexico or, presumably, in other foreign countries. The Arizona
uninsured motorist statute requires that "no automobile liability
or motor vehicle liability policy . . . shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this state, with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state, unless coverage is provided" for accidents involving uninsured motorists. 57 The language requiring uninsured motorist coverage with every liability
policy issued supports an interpretation that all automobile insurance policies provide coextensive liability and uninsured motorist coverage. It does not contemplate partial uninsured motorist coverage.
The majority of state uninsured motorist statutes provide
that an insured may reject uninsured motorist coverage if he so
desires. 58 Interpreting such a statute, 59 the California Supreme
Court noted that the only way the legislature provided for a
waiver of uninsured motorist coverage was by a written rejection 60
and held that the statute would not allow a territorial or any other
restriction of uninsured motorist coverage. 61 Based on the reasoning of the California Supreme Court, an interpretation requiring
coextensive coverage would be even more justified in states such
as Arizona that require uninsured motorist coverage on all vehicles, with no right of rejection. 62
Ins. Co. v. Edgington, 13 Ariz. App. 374, 375, 476 P.2d 895, 896 (1970); Garcia v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 20-259.01(B)
(1975). The instant case illustrates parties agreeing to expanded territory.
56. See notes 13-20 and accompanying text supra.
57. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(A) (1975).
58. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
59. 1961 Cal. Stats., ch. 1189, § 1 (current version at CAL. INs. CooE § 11580.2(a)
(West 1972)).
60. Mission Ins. Co. v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d at 509-10, 407 P.2d at 276, 47 Cal. Rptr. at
164.
61. See id. at 511,407 P.2d at 277, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 365; notes 30-33 and accompanying
text supra.
62. The argument is that the legislature has mandated uninsured motorist coverage
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This interpretation of the statutory language is the most viable, allowing the application of the statute to change with the
needs of the motoring public. For example, as times change and
insurance companies expand their liability underwriting to new
territories, uninsured motorist coverage would likewise expand
into those territories. This interpretation would also explain the
lack of territorial boundaries in the uninsured motorist statutes. 83
This interpretation of the statute is supported by a number
of cases wherein insurers, while granting liability coverage
throughout the United States and Canada, attempted to limit
uninsured motorist coverage to a particular state border or at the
United States-Canadian boundary. Courts facing this analogous
situation have held that uninsured motorist coverage followed
liability coverage throughout the United States and Canada. 84

3.

Uninsured motorist protection wherever insureds travel

Since one of the primary purposes of uninsured motorist statutes is to afford protection to victims of negligent uninsured motorists, 115 another explanation of the absence of statutorily prescribed territorial boundaries is that the various state legislatures
intended to protect United States citizens from the financial
hardships encountered following an accident with an uninsured
motorist anywhere in the world. This interpretation is supported
by the statutory language itself, 68 wherein no provision is made
for any exclusions of coverage based on territorial limits. It is
appealing in terms of public policy bec~use it provides the greatest amount of protection to American citizens.
This interpretation, however, is filled with inherent weaknesses.67 United States insurance companies are not prepared or
on all insured vehicles, with no right of rejection. If the court were to uphold a policy
provision limiting uninsured motorist coverage to territory less than liability coverage, it
would allow the insurer to indirectly reject coverage while it cannot do so directly. See,
e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 22 Ariz. App. 309, 310, 526 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1974).
63. Under this interpretation the minimum boundary of uninsured motorist coverage
would be the United States and Canada, but the boundaries would always coincide with
those specified in the accompanying liability coverage.
64. See, e.g., Askey v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 632,
290 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1968) (holding that coverage existed for an accident that occurred in
Canada); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Porras, 214 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(effectively invalidating an uninsured motorist endorsement provision which seemed to
restrict coverage to accidents within the state of New York).
65. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
66. For the language of the Arizona statute, see note 42 supra.
67. While the court did not express its reasons, this interpretation was promptly
rejected. 27 Ariz. App. at 161, 551 P.2d at 1327.
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willing to accept the onerous burden of insuring the worldwide
travels of American citizens solely through their automobile liability insurance policies. The number and frequency of fraudulent claims would undoubtedly increase. Litigation of claims
would be beset with severe evidentiary and jurisdictional problems for both the parties and the courts. Finally, because so few
American citizens drive their own cars to foreign countries other
than Canada and Mexico, it cannot rationally be argued that the
state legislatures enacting uninsured motorist statutes fifteen to
twenty years ago intended to provide worldwide uninsured motorist coverage to their citizens.
4. Territorial question probably not considered by most
legislatures

The various state legislatures probably failed to foresee or
consider the territorial issue involved in the instant case. All state
financial responsibility laws are similar, 68 and, as previously discussed, uninsured motorist statutes are basically uniform
throughout the country. 69 Because of the nationwide similarity of
the statutes, it is conceivable that many of the state legislatures
adopting these laws did so with limited discussion. 70 Hence, legislative intent regarding the extension of uninsured motorist coverage into foreign countries cannot conclusively be inferred from
statutory language. 71
68. All state financial responsibility laws are the "security-proof' type of act promulgated by the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety in the Uniform Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. WooDRUFF, supra note 7, § 3.5; see note 70 infra.
69. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
70. This may be inferred from the reviser's note following Arizona's introductory
section of its financial responsibility laws, ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28-1101 (1976): "This chapter
is based on the Uniform Motor Safety Responsibility Act, promulgated by the National
Conference on Street and Highway Safety. . . . The substance of the Arizona law on
financial responsibility is . . . identical to that of the uniform act except where differences
are indicated by reviser's notes."
71. If anything, the history of these two statutes in Arizona evidences legislative
intent favoring the maximum availability of increasing amounts of insurance for the
greatest number of Arizona citizens. Arizona's original uninsured motorist statute required uninsured motorist coverage to be offered in all policies but allowed the insured to
reject the endorsement if he so desired. As amended in 1972, the statute requires uninsured motorist coverage on all policies, with no right of rejection on the part of the insured.
Arizona's original financial responsibility law has also been amended several times, each
raising the minimum amount of coverage required of automobile insurers. At one time it
required minimum coverage of (a) $5000 for bodily injury or death of one person in any
one accident; (b) $10,000 for bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any one
accident; and (c) $1000 for property damage resulting in any one accident. In 1966 those
limits were raised to $10,000/20,000/5,000, and in 1972 to $15,000/30,000/10,000 respectively.
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Public Policy Evidenced by Nonstatutory Sources

It is clear that uninsured. motorist statutory language alone
will support a number of different interpretations regarding the
territorial issue involved in the instant case. Reaching a correct
interpretation therefore requires analysis of nonstatutory factors
such as public policy. Unfortunately, the court failed to analyze
public policy appropriately. Among the nonstatutory public policies that should have been considered are the public policy involved in extending uninsured motorist coverage into Mexico and
Arizona's judicial public policy regarding insurance funds and
insurance claims.
1. Public policy considerations in extending coverage into
Mexico

The court avoided the case's paramount public policy question by treating the issue as one concerning the extension of uninsured motorist coverage to the far corners of the earth. 72 While
that issue may arise in the future, it was not before the court.
Rather, the court was dealing with events occurring in Mexico,
which shares over 1300 miles of international boundaries with the
United States. By giving the issue a worldwide scope, the court
apparently ignored the fact that with the exception of Canada
(wherein uninsured motorist coverage already extends), Mexico
is the only foteign nation into which American citizens can drive
directly. Hence, the issue of uninsured motorist coverage in contiguous countries is much more relevant than the global context
pronounced in the court's opinion.
A strong public policy argument can be made for requiring
coextensive uninsured motorist coverage when liability coverage
extends into Mexico. The number of United States citizens traveling into Mexico has increased at an enormous rate in the last
few decades. 73 Automobile insurance companies have correspondingly enlarged the territorial limits of liability coverage in some
of their policies. Some policies provide liability coverage into
Mexico for a specified number of miles,7 4 others provide Mexico
endorsements for limited numbers of trips or for a limited amount
72. Even though the court discussed uninsrued motorist coverage in Mexico, the
language used in justifying and explaining its holding referred to "all parts of the world"
and to "Afars and Issas." 27 Ariz. App. at 161, 551 P.2d at 1327.
73. See note 26 supra.
74. See note 27 supra.
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of time. 7li A recent trend in insurance policy provisions is to enlarge the territorial limits of liability coverage to anywhere in the
world. 76 Yet all of these policies limit uninsured motorist coverage
to the territorial United States and Canada.
This limitation leaves American motorists in Mexico with
little or no protection in case of accident, particularly in light of
the fact that only twenty percent of Mexico's driving public is
insured. 77 Even though all United States citizens traveling into
Mexico are encouraged to and should purchase Mexican automobile insurance for other reasons, 78 they will find that uninsured
motorist coverage from a Mexican insurance company is unavailable. 79 Hence, unless American insurers writing liability coverage
in Mexico provide uninsured motorist coverage, American citizens driving in Mexico will have insufficient coverage. A further
deficiency arises since Mexican insurance policies do not cover
passengers injured in an automobile whose driver was negligent. 80
Finally, Mexican law allows insurance companies to exclude coverage from accidents if the insured tortfeasor is under the influence of alcohol. 111 Therefore, even if the tortfeasor carries Mexican
insurance, the American victim may not be compensated.
While the preceding facts highlight the American motoring
public's need for uninsured motorist coverage in Mexico, the
same facts explain the insurance industry's refusal to expand that
75. ld.
76. ld.
77. Note 28 supra.
78. See generally Robbins & Netherton, Mexican Automobile & Insurance Law, 47
MtcH. ST. B.J. 22, 28 (Jan. 1968). The United States insurance companies providing
Mexico endorsements give the following warning therein:
UNLESS YOU HAVE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE WRITI'EN BY A
MEXICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, YOU MAY SPEND MANY HOURS
OR DAYS IN JAIL, IF YOU HAVE AN ACCIDENT IN MEXICO. INSURANCE COVERAGE SHOULD BE SECURED FROM A COMPANY LICENSED UNDER THE LAWS OF MEXICO TO WRITE SUCH INSURANCE IN ORDER TO AVOID COMPLICATIONS AND SOME OTHER PENALTIES POSSIBLE UNDER THE LAWS OF MEXICO, INCLUDING THE
POSSIBLE IMPOUNDMENT OF YOUR AUTOMOBILE.
Brief for Appellee at 20.
79. Robbins & Netherton, supra note 78, at 28.
80. ld. at 27. Thus, even if a United States citizen buys Mexican automobile insurance, should there be an accident caused by his own negligence, any injuries sustained
by his passengers are excluded from coverage. This was the position of the claimants in
the instant case.
The basic uninsured motorist coverage in American insurance policies covers injuries
sustained by both the driver and his passengers. P. PRETZEL, supra note 18, § 19.5.
81. Robbins & Netherton, supra note 78, at 27; see, e.g., Ramirez v. Wilshire Ins. Co.,
13 Cal. App. 3d 622, 91 Cal. Rptr. 895, 897 (1970).
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coverage. Obviously, if Mexican insurance companies refuse to
provide uninsured motorist coverage because eighty percent of
their country's drivers are uninsured, there exists a high risk in
underwriting uninsured motorist coverage in Mexico. Additionally, since the laws of Mexico allow Mexican insurance companies
to exclude liability protection from passengers in a vehicle and to
deny coverage if the insured is intoxicated, the already high risks
of protecting against uninsured motorists are greatly magnified.
If insurance companies are forced to assume this high risk of
uninsured motorist protection in Mexico, the policy premiums
paid by American citizens will need to rise accordingly.
These arguments are not persuasive, however, since motorists can choose to buy liability policies with or without coverage
in Mexico. Those who seldom or never travel to Mexico can purchase less expensive insurance without the extended coverage;
those who do travel to Mexico can pay for the added protection.
It seems doubtful that Americans who drive in Mexico would
object to paying for coextensive uninsured motorist protection,
especially in light of the serious risks involved. Additionally, the
California Supreme Court's decision in Mission Insurance Co. v.
Brown requiring such an extension apparently did little to affect
the insurance industry, its underwriting, 82 or the public's ability
to afford insurance in that state. Finally, as discussed below,
Arizona courts have shown more concern for the protection of its
citizens than for the burden such protection imposes upon the
insurance industry.

2. Arizona judicial public policy regarding insurance funds and
insurance claims
Arizona courts have been among the most progressive in
granting the claims of automobile accident victims to insurance
funds held for their benefit. In fact, the court that decided the
instant case has stated:
Our Supreme Court has made it clear in its decisions . . .
that it regards the claims of automobile accident victims to
funds created by insurance as interests of the highest protectible
order. While those opinions have been the subject of criticism,
82. Apparently some companies insuring California motorists haven't even changed
their policy language following Mission Ins. Co. v. Brown. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n
v. Kresch, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 645-46, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 775-76 (dictum criticizing an
insurance company that retained in its policies the provision held void and contrary to
public policy in Mission Ins. Co. v. Brown).
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. . . they remain intact as strong expressions of the public policy of our state. They indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere
but in the forefront of jurisdictions in making available to automobile accident victims the fullest benefits of insurance coverage.R3

Arizona courts have progressively extended insurance coverage for Arizona residents by voiding numerous restrictive policy
provisions and expanding the scope of others. For example, the
Arizona Supreme Court was one of the first to hold that the
omnibus clause 84 prescribed in the- financial responsibility laws
must be a part of every motor vehicle liability policy. 85 By voiding
a clause in the policy, the court made insurance proceeds available to people who formerly would have been excluded from coverage and evidenced a willingness to interpret liberally the state's
financial responsibility laws to meet the needs of the Arizona
public.
More closely related to the instant case are the Arizona decisions involving uninsured motorist coverage, which also evide~ce
a progressive public policy regarding claims of injured insureds.
Stating that the "uninsured motorist statute . '. . is a strongly
worded statutory mandate to be liberally construed in accordance
with its remedial purposes," 86 Arizona courts have repeatedly
sought to support a pronounced public policy that under unin83. Geyer v. Reserve Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 467, 447 P.2d 556, 559 (1968) (citations
omitted).
84. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28-1170(8)(2) (1976) and companion statutes from the large
majority of states that have adopted the Uniform Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provide that an owner's policy of insurance "shall insure the person named therein and any
other person, as insured, using the motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or
implied permission of the named insured . . . ." In the insurance trade, this provision is
referred to as the "omnibus clause."
85. The Arizona Supreme Court so helo in Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exch., 93 Ariz.
287, 380 P.2d 145 (1963). California, Wildman v. Government Empl. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d
31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957), and North Dakota, Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975), have also held the omnibus clause to be a part of every
automobile liability policy issued in their states.
This means that anyone who drives an insured vehicle with the express or implied
permission of the insured is automatically an additional insured under the policy, irrespective of whether or not there was a restrictive endorsement in the policy excluding
the person as an insured. The majority of states hold that the omnibus clause applies only
to "certified policies," those required by the financial responsibility laws after a driver's
"first bite," in contrast with those policies voluntarily carried by most drivers at lower
premiums. See Comment, Automobile Liability Insurers in Arizona-Are They Absolutely
Liable? 5 ARIZ. L. REv. 248, 250-52 (1964).
86. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pesqueria, 19 Ariz. App. 528, 529, 508 P.2d 1172, 1173
(1973).
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sured motorist coverage, "every insured is entitled to recover the
damages he or she would have been able to recover if the uninsured motorist had maintained a policy of liability insurance in
a solvent company ."K7
In Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., gs an insured who was injured in an automobile accident received only a
portion of the minimum amount specified in the financial responsibility law because of a multiple splitting of the tortfeasor's liability insurance. The court held that he was entitled to recover
the additional amount of his damages up to the statutory minimum from his uninsured motorist coverage. 89 In so holding, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated:
We agree with the principle that the person who avails himself of the protection afforded by uninsured motorist coverage
should be permitted to recover as if the tort-feasor had the minimum amount of liability insurance . . . . This is so whether this
sum is recoverable under the insured's policy alone or in combination with those funds actually receivable from the tortfeasor's
liability coverage. 90

In Porter the Arizona Supreme Court again placed Arizona in the
forefront of jurisdictions granting full insurance benefits, being
the first to hold that an insured is entitled to remuneration under
his uninsured motorist coverage even though a tortfeasor carries
liability insurance satisfying the requirements of the financial
responsibility laws. 91 In so doing the court ignored the universal
precedent on the issue, 92 policy provisions specifically excluding
87. See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 22 Ariz. App. 309, 310, 526 P.2d 1264, 1265
(1974).
88. 106 Ariz. 274, 475 P.2d 258 (1970).
89. Because of a four-way division of the tortfeasor's liability insurance proceeds, the
claimant received only $2500 for his injuries. The court held that he was entitled to recover
an additional $7500 of his admitted damages under his uninsured motorist coverage. /d.
at 279, 475 P.2d at 263.
90. Id.
91. The following jurisdictions now follow the precedent established by Arizona and
cite Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. as controlling authority: Hawaii, Palisbo v.
Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 547 P.2d 1350, 1353-54 (Hawaii 1976); New Jersey, Gorton v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 137 N.J. Super. 558, 350 A.2d 77, 80-81 (1975); see Hanlon v. Buckeye
Union Ins. Co., 324 N.E.2d 598, 605 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahaga County 1975).
92. The majority rule is that a tortfeasor is not an uninsured motorist if he carries
the minimum insurance coverage required by state statute. Therefore, an injured victim
cannot recover against his own insurer under his uninsured motorist endorsement if the
tortfeasor is insured within the statutory minimum. E.g., Simmons v. Hartford Ace. &
Indem. Co., 543 P.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Okla. 1975); Lund v. Mission Ins. Co., 270 Ore. 461,
467-68, 528 P.2d 78, 81 (1974).
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coverage in such situations, and the burden that their holding
would place on the insurance industry.
Other decisions of Arizona courts have declared void as contrary to the remedial purpose of the uninsured motorist statute
and as contrary to Arizona public policy numerous attempts by
insurers to restrict the recovery of persons injured by uninsured
motorists. 93 The Arizona Supreme Court has stated:
It is our opinion that in enacting [Arizona's uninsured motorist statute] it was the intent of the Legislature that each
insured who availed himself of uninsured motorist coverage
would have available not less than $10,000 per person and
$20,000 per occurrence. Any attempt, by contract or otherwise,
to reduce any part of this amount is violative of the statute. 94

It is clear that the Arizona courts support the remedial purpose of Arizona's uninsured motorist statute by voiding insurance
policy provisions that attempt to restrict liability. Moreover, Arizona courts have initiated several forms of insurance law reform,
ignoring restrictive policy provisions to provide maxim urn uninsured motorist coverage to Arizona citizens. In light of these clear
manifestations of public policy, the instant court's determination
of the issue before it is surprising. The court failed to take advantage of this prime opportunity to maintain Arizona's position "in
the forefront of jurisdictions making available to automobile accident victims the fullest benefits of insurance coverage." 95

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Arizona court's holding that uninsured motorist coverage need cover only claims arising from accidents in the United
States and Canada was based on the narrowest of several possible
interpretations of the territorial requirements of uninsured motorist coverage. The holding is supported by one interpretation of
93. E.g., Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970)
(declaring void as against public policy a provision offsetting against uninsured motorist
protection any amounts paid under the medical coverage of the same policy); Dairyland
Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 22 Ariz. App. 309, 526 P.2d 1264 (1974) (declaring void as against public
policy a provision in the policy allowing the insurer to deny coverage if the insured settled
a claim without the consent of the insurer); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Larriva, 19 Ariz. App.
385, 507 P.2d 997 (1973) (declaring void as against public policy provisions reducing
uninsured motorist coverage by the amount recovered from workmen's compensation
funds).
94. Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 106 Ariz. at 283, 475 P.2d at 267 (emphasis
in original).
95. Geyer v. Reserve Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 467, 447 P.2d 556, 559 (1968). See
note 83 and accompanying text supra.
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the statutory language and some elements of public policy, but
it ignores both the needs of the increasing numbers of Arizona
citizens driving into Mexico and Arizona's progressive judicial
public policy dealing with insurance claims and coverage.
A better reasoned course would have been to hold, as did the
California Supreme Court, that when an insurance company voluntarily writes an insurance policy extending liability coverage
into Mexico, it cannot deny the insured the benefits of uninsured
motorist coverage in that same terri tory. Requiring coextensive
liability and uninsured motorist coverage would close a gap in
Arizona's existing minimum standards of insurance protection.

